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An Asymmetrical Approach to the
Problem of Peremptories?
By Richard D. Friedman*
The Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, and the
extension of Batson to parties other than prosecutors, may be
expected to put pressure on the institution ofperemptory challenges.
After a brief review of the history of peremptories, this article
contends that peremptories for criminal defendants serve important
values ofour criminal justice system. It then argues that peremptories
for prosecutors are not as important, and that it may no longer be
worthwhile to maintain them in light ofthe administrative complexities inevitable in a system of peremptories consistent with Batson.
The article concludes that the asymmetry of allowing peremptories
for the accused but not for the prosecution is not troublesome.

In 1986, in Batson v. Kentucky, 1 the Supreme Court hel<l
that the Constitution forbids a criminal prosecutor to exercise
peremptory challenges to potential jurors in a racially discriminatory manner. Batson raised a host of important issues. Most
obvious, perhaps, was the question of whether the prohibition of
Batson would be extended to litigating parties other than a
criminal prosecutor. In its last two terms, the Court has answered
that queston resoundingly. Last year, in Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co. ,2 the Court extended Batson to civil litigants. And
this year, the Court completed the circle, holding in Georgia
v. McCollum 3 that neither may criminal defendants exercise
peremptories in a racially discriminatory manner.

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Many thanks to Tom
Ferries for excellent research assistance, and to my colleagues Tom Green, Jerry
Israel, Yale Kamisar, Rick Lempert, and Debra Livingston for valuable advice and
comments. Because of editorial policy, masculine pronouns are used throughout
this article.
I 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2

3

111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
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Thus, the question of who is bound by Batson has been
resolved, or at least nearly so, 4 in a couple of broad brushstrokes.
But other problems and complexities remain, and they are sure
to put pressure on the continued maintenance of the institution
of peremptory challenges itself. Indeed, in McCollum Justice
Thomas, concurring, predicted dolefully that the death of peremptories was inevitable. 5 To many, though, that would be a
welcome development. Concurring in Batson, Justice Thomas's
predecessor, Justice Marshall, advocated the abolition of peremptories.6 And recently, three judges of the New York Court
of Appeals-one shy of a majority on the highest court in the
state-endorsed the same idea. 7
This essay presents another, somewhat more moderate possibility, which may at first sound slightly odd, although in fact it
has deep historical roots: retention of the accused's peremptories
but elimination of the prosecution's.
The Historical Perspective

Although peremptory challenges in civil cases appear to be a
relatively recent creation, 8 in criminal cases they are very old.
• The caveat reflects the suggestion made by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
Inc., as amicus in McCollum, that different considerations apply when the peremptories are exercised by an accused who is a member of a racial minority. Justice
Thomas referred somewhat sneeringly to this suggestion. 112 S. Ct. at 2360 n. 2.
Although McCollum was based on the rights of the juror rather than on those of the
accused, it seems unlikely that the Court would openly adopt different rules for
defendants-or, for that matter jurors- of different races. Of course, application of
McCollum will vary from one case to another, and it is impossible to be confident
that the race of the accused will not be a significant factor.
s 112 S. Ct. at 2360.
6
476 U.S. at 103.
7
People v. Bolling, 79 N. Y.2d 317, 591 N.E.2d 1136 (1992). See also Alschuler,
"The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Review of Jury Verdicts," 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153, 170 (1989) ("Even when
exercised on grounds other than race, these challenges are unconstitutional");
Hastie, "Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedure for the Selection
of Impartial Juries?,'' 40 American U. L. Rev. 703, 726 (''Jury selection procedures
should . . . reduce or eliminate the institution of peremptory challenges.");
Steinberg, ''The Case for Eliminating Peremptory Challenges,'' 27 Crim. L. Bull.
216 (1991); Mintz, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Direction
(Racial Discrimination and Peremptory Challenges Under the Heavier Confines of
Equal Protection)," 72 Cornell L. Rev. 1026 (1987); Gurney, Note, "The Case for
Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials," 231 Harv. Civ. RightsCiv. Lib. L. Rev. 227 (1986).
8
Blackstone speaks of peremptories only in criminal cases. 4 William Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England* 353.
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The common law was generous in its provision of peremptories
to criminal defendants, allowing them 35, later reduced (except
in cases of high treason) to 20. The allowance of peremptory
challenges was extolled by Blackstone in Commentaries on the
Laws of England as "a provision full of that tenderness and
humanity to prisoners for which our English laws are justly
famous. " 9 But by a statute of 1305, enacted to correct a bias
toward the prosecution in the selection of jurors, peremptory
challenges were denied to the king' s attorneys. 10 This prohibition
was only marginally effective, because prosecutors were allowed
to require a member of the venire to "stand aside," giving a
reason only if a jury of twelve could not be selected. 11 The
"standing aside" procedure did not, however, find quick or
universal acceptance in the United States. This resistance appears
to be attributable to the same perception that led to the constitutionalization of the jury right-the perception of the jury as an
essential bulwark against state oppression. Thus, New York did
not allow prosecutors any form of peremptory challenge until
1881 and Virginiadidnotunti11919Yin 1856, the U.S. Supreme
Court held, pursuant to statute, that federal courts should follow
the procedure of the state in which they sat with respect to
prosecutors' peremptories. 13 But through the nineteenth century,
as the mistrust of government characteristic of the Revolutionary
era gave way to increasing acceptance of state power, peremptories for the prosecution gradually became the rule rather than the
exception. 14
Even today, prosecutors are not always given the same
number of peremptories as the accused. Under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 24(b), for example, in noncapital felony
cases the accused is given ten peremptories and the government
only six. And statutes in seventeen states provide more peremptories to the accused than to the prosecution in at least
9Jd.
10
Ordinance for Inquests, 33 Edw. I, st. 4 (1305).
11
Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commitment to Representative Panels 148 (1977).
12
/d. at 148-149 & n. 46.
13
United States v. Shackleford, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 588 (1856).
14
Van Dyke, note 11 supra at 150.
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some criminal prosecutions. 15 Local practices may add more
asymmetries.
Peremptories for the Accused: "Tenderness and
Humanity,'' Efficiency, and the Perception of Fairness

The historical background suggests that, although peremptories now are provided to both sides in civil and criminal litigation,
they exist principally for the benefit of criminal defendants.
The value of the accused's peremptories may be assessed by
comparing the status quo with the situation that would prevail if
they did not exist. Presumably more liberal granting of challenges
for cause would take up some of the slack caused by elimination
of the accused's peremptories. Nevertheless, for several reasons
it is far preferable to retain the accused's peremptories.
Perhaps most obviously, even if the standard for a cause
challenge is lowered, a biased juror will very often escape it.
Largely for this reason, Justice Thomas, although concurring in
McCollum, purportedly on the ground of stare decisis, expressed
grave misgivings:
I am certain that black criminal defendants will rue the day that this
court ventured down this road that inexorably will lead to the elimination
of peremptory strikes .... Today's decision, while protecting jurors,
leaves defendants with less means of protecting themselves. Unless
jurors actually admit prejudice during voir dire, defendants generally
must allow them to sit and run the risk that racial animus will affect the
verdict. 16

Indeed, in some cases, an accused may reasonably conclude on
the basis of one or more aspects of a potential juror's background
or attitudes that he is less likely than the potential juror next in
line to find in favor of the accused. Such a probabilistic judgment
is an appropriate basis on which to exercise a peremptory
challenge, and it will weed out some biased jurors. In most cases,
though, it cannot support a challenge for cause, 17 unless the
15

Ginger, 1 Jury Selection in Civil and Criminal Trials 173 ( 1984 & 1992 suppl.).
112 S. Ct. at 2360.
7
' See Lempert, "Jury Size and the Peremptory Challenge: Testimony on Jury
Reform,'' 22 Law Quadrangle Notes No. 2, 8, 12 (Winter 1978) (''almost insoluble
difficulties for a system which relies on the challenge for cause" posed "where a
suspicion of bias is engendered not by some specific prejudice, but rather by a set of
diffuse attitudes that characterize the juror's outlook on life.").
16
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standard for a cause challenge is eased so much as to sap it of
virtually all meaning. 18
The point should not be overstated: It is probably relatively
rare that the availability of peremptories actually prevents an
inaccurate verdict. Empirical research suggests that attorneys,
despite extensive efforts, and even aided by ''scientific'' selection
methods, actually tend in most cases to have only modest success
in identifying jurors inclined to find adversely. 19 And even where
the attorney is able to identify hostile jurors, in most cases it is
unlikely that the use of peremptories will prevent an inaccurate
verdict. 20
But, even if peremptories are of only occasional importance
in contributing to fairness itself, they are of consistent, although
not as dramatic, importance in contributing to the perception of
fairness. No system of challenges for cause can serve as well as
peremptories the crucial function of giving the accused a strong
sense that his jury is fair. 21 The accused may be suspicious of a
juror ''even without being able to assign a reason.' ' 22 Or perhaps
the accused knows the reason but is not able to persuade the
18
The author's colleague, Professor Richard Lempert, has suggested that trial
judges may tend to be overly hostile, rather than overly receptive, to cause challenges
made by an accused. To the extent this is so, it would be another important reason
for not relying solely on a system of cause challenges to protect the accused in jury
selection, even though the elimination of peremptories would naturally tend to cause
some liberalization in the grant of cause challenges.
19
See Hastie, note 7 supra at 717-719 ("attorneys, relying on their experience
and intuition, are not very acute judges of juror bias" but "do exercise a small
influence on the outcome of a few cases; ' ' ''the party employing 'scientific' selection
methods yields slightly better results than the side using conventional, intuitionbased voir dire or random selection").
20
A peremptory does not prevent the inclusion of a biased juror unless the
attorney identifies the juror as relatively hostile and a challenge for cause fails (or
would fail if made). And even if in a given case the exercise of peremptories does
prevent the inclusion of one or more biased jurors, it still may be unlikely that denial
of peremptories would lead to an inaccurate result; at least where jury unanimity is
required, the inclusion of one or a few biased jurors is probably more likely to cause
a hung jury than to transform an accurate verdict into an inaccurate one.
21
See Hastie note 7 supra, at 725 ("social science research on procedural justice
strongly implies that increased involvement of the defense attorney would be
associated with a greater impression of fairness in the defendant's mind") (citation
omitted); Barbara Allen Babcock, "Voir Dire: Preserving Its 'Wonderful Power' ",
27 Stan. L. Rev. 545, 552 (1975) (peremptories serve a didactic function, teaching
the litigant and thus the community that the jury is a good model for deciding
''because in a real sense the jury belongs to the litigant: he chooses it .... The ideal
that the peremptory serves is that the jury not only should be fair and impartial, but
should seem to be so to those whose fortunes are at issue.").
22
Blackstone, note 8 supra, at 353.
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judge that it amounts to good cause; it may be that the juror
belongs to a group that the accused believes, as a statistical
matter, is significantly less likely than the average run of jurors
to find in his favor. 23 The value of peremptory challenges lies
precisely in their peremptoriness-that the accused can remove
a potential juror whom he suspects would be biased against him
(or merely less likely to vote for acquittal than the next potential
juror) without having to persuade anyone. Peremptories thus
help remove even grounds of suspicion that are weak or that
would be difficult or embarrassing to articulate. 24
Given the nature of a criminal trial, in which the state attempts
to deprive an individual of liberty (or even of life), increasing
not only the actuality of fairness but also the accused's perception
of fairness is a crucial goal. 25 Punishment by the state is more
easily justifiable when that perception is a strong one. This
consideration is especially important when the accused is particularly vulnerable to oppression by the state and prejudice by
portions of the populace-and, as suggested by Justice Thomas
in McCollum, that may be when peremptoties serve their most
important purpose.
The accused's peremptories have other, subsidiary benefits as well. To develop a challenge for cause often requires extensive questioning of a juror, and as Blackstone pointed out,
''the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment.' ' 26 The problem is inevitable, and making the
23
See Pizzi, "Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient,"
1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 97, 126 ("What really happens at the peremptory challenges
stage is comparison shopping.'').
24
The embarrassment is not only to the accused. For pre-Batson views, see
Spears, Note, "Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the
Exercise of Peremptory Challenges," 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1493, 1503 ("the judicial
system lets the parties handle under the guise of silence and caprice what the courts
themselves should not and perhaps cannot handle rationally"), and Babcock, note
21 supra, at 553-554 (peremptories avoid the "societally divisive" need for
''trafficking in the core of truth in most common stereotypes'').
25
Indeed, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, to the extent that it
applies to hearsay statements, is based in substantial part on this consideration. See
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1018-1019 (1988); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530,540
(1986). The author of this article has described very briefly and roughly the
principles that he believes should govern the hearsay aspect of the Confrontation
Clause in ''Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay,'' 76
Minn. L. Rev. 723, 726 n. 10 (1992).
26
Lempert, note 17 supra, at 12-13, also argues that challenges for cause may
be ''degrading or insulting'' to the challenged juror, whereas a peremptory challenge
has the ''virtue of saving face.'' To the extent this is a problem with challenges for
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system more dependent on challenges for cause would aggravate
it. 27
Finally, in some cases peremptories offer efficiency benefits.
Occasionally, the exercise of a peremptory may keep off the jury
an outlier, someone who would not persuade his colleagues but
who might through sheer stubbornness or conviction cause a
hung jury. Moreover, challenges for cause are more expensive
to administer than are peremptory challenges. Not only must
groundwork be laid in questioning, but an argument must be
made to the judge, who must rule, and if the ruling is against the
accused an appeal is possible. Peremptories, by contrast, to the
extent they are allowed to be truly peremptory, are about as simple
to administer as could be. The importance of this consideration is
mitigated, but not altogether eliminated, by the fact that, so long
as the accused does not have a surplus of them, he has a strong
incentive to develop a challenge for cause against a juror whom
he wishes to exclude, thus saving one of his peremptories.
Peremptories for the Prosecutor: Is the Game Worth the
Candle?

Prosecutors' peremptories stand on weaker ground than do
the accused's. Indeed, as the historical background has indicated,
during much of the last 700 years or so, peremptories have
not been as firmly established for prosecutors as for criminal
defendants. There is good reason for this: The crucial function
of increasing the accused's perception of fairness is not served
by prosecutors' peremptories. Indeed, that function will be
disserved to the extent that the prosecutor uses his peremptories
to exclude jurors who, although apparently fair-minded, have
backgrounds and attitudes suggesting that they are more likely
than the average member of the community to find in favor of
the accused.
Batson has mitigated, although hardly eliminated, one serious
aspect of this problem, the tendency for prosecutors to use
peremptories discriminatorily against potential jurors from micause, it might be mitigated, but not eliminated, by attempting to prevent the juror
from learning why he was excluded and at whose instance.
27
See Babcock, note 21 supra, at 552-553 (Because of potential alienation from
questioning, ''[w]ithout the insurance of the peremptory challenge, a party would
be far less able to search for cause to eliminate jurors.'').
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nority ethnic groups. 28 At the same time, however, Batson has
created a serious disadvantage of another type: It has made
prosecutors' peremptories a frightfully expensive procedural
nightmare. Batson has meant that very often-particularly where
the accused is a member of a minority group, but even in some
cases where he is not29-the prosecutor's exercise of peremptories
threatens to append a minicase of discrimination onto the criminal
trial. And the discrimination case is not so easily resolved.
In some cases, the court must first determine whether the
group assertedly excluded is cognizable under the Batson doctrine. If the prosecutor excludes blacks or Hispanics willy-nilly,
that will run afoul of Batson, but presumably if he does the same
to plumbers or pipefitters that will not. What if the prosecutor
excludes people whose names sound Italian? The cases seem to
be at odds. 3° Conflicts such as this one may be resolved in time,
but new ones are sure to arise as courts test the outer reaches of
Batson. One court, for example, has applied Batson to disallow
a peremptory challenge of a hearing-imparied juror. 3 '
If the court determines that the discrimination alleged is the
type covered by Batson, it must then determine whether a prima
See Brown, McGuire, & Winters, "The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse," 14 New Eng. L. Rev.
192, 234 (1978) (proposing, before Batson, that prosecutors' peremptories be
eliminated "[u]nless and until courts are equipped with effective means for intervening against discriminatory uses of the peremptory challenge.").
29
See Powers v. Ohio, IllS. Ct. 1364 (1991) (murder trial, white victim, white
accused; held, 7-2, that accused has standing to object to prosecutor's use of
peremptories to exclude black jurors).
30
See Note, Batson v. Kentucky: Two Years Later, 24 Tulsa L.J. 63, 80-81
(1988); United States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1063 (1988) (not cognizable); United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 833-834 (1st
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 844 (1988) (defendants failed to show that Italians
are a cognizable racial group and that veniremen whose names ended in vowels
necessarily were Italian); United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89,95-96 (2d Cir. 1988),
certdenied, 489 U.S. 1052 (noting, without ruling on, trial court's characterization of
Italian-Americans as a cognizable racial group, and finding no abuse of discretion
in denial of new trial because the prosecutor offered reasonable neutral explanations,
e.g., that panel members or their spouses held positions that might enable them to
identify one of the defendants).
31
People v. Green, 148 Misc. 2d 666, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Westchester Co. Ct.
1990).
The possibilities are seemingly endless. Suppose the prosecution in a rape trial
challenges young men. Is that covered? There appear to be no published cases as
yet, but no doubt there will be. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 409 Mass. 689, 568
N.E.2d 1158 (1991) (trial judge committed reversible error in not allowing rape
defendant, who had not challenged older women, to exercise peremptories against
three young women).
28
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facie case of discrimination is made out. According to the
New York Court of Appeals, "[t]here are no fixed rules" for
answering this question; the statistics of whom the prosecutor
challenges and whom he accepts are helpful, but not conclusive,
especially when the accused's objection is to a single peremptory
challenge. Such factors as "objective facts indicating that the
prosecutor has challenged members of a particular racial group
who might be expected to favor the prosecution because of their
backgrounds'' must also be taken into account. 32
If the court does find a prima facie case of discrimination,
the sideshow is not over, because the prosecutor has the opportunity to demonstrate that the exercise of peremptories was done
of a permissible basis. Suppose that the accused is Hispanic, and
that much of the testimony will be in Spanish. Can the prosecutor
defend peremptory challenges of Spanish-speaking jurors by
expressing fear that they will follow their own understanding of
the testimony rather than the official translation? The Supreme
Court has said yes. 33 It is difficult to know which this puts in the
most unfavorable light-the judicial exaltation of the translation
over the actual testimony, the Batson rule, or peremptories
themselves. 34
32

People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 323-324, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (1992).
There is a slightly bizarre aspect to this consideration, although it may be inevitable
given Batson. In exercising peremptories, the prosecutor is not only allowed, but
expected, to adhere to generalizations based on the background of a potential
juror, but the prosecutor must disregard one crucial facet of the potential juror's
background, his race, that may have affected that juror's life and perspective more
strongly than any, or nearly any, other. Cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-504
(1972) (pre-Batson case, upholding standing of white man to challenge jury selection
system that effectively excluded blacks; '' [W]hen any large and identifiable segment
of the community is excluded from jury service, [the] exclusion deprives the jury of
a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case
that may be presented.").
33
Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). Justice Kennedy's opinion
for a four-justice plurality did make a suggestion for the future. He said that:
though petitioner did not suggest the alternative to the trial court here, Spanishspeaking jurors could be permitted to advise the judge in a discreet way of any
concerns with the translation during the course of trial. A prosecutor's persistence
in the desire to exclude Spanish-speaking jurors despite this measure could be
taken into account in determining whether to accept a race-neutral explanation for
the challenge.
111 S. Ct. at 1868. Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented in part
on the basis that this remedy could have been adopted by the trial judge in
Hernandez's case.
3
• See generally Alschuler, note 7 supra, at 173-176 (noting the flimsy explanations that have been held sufficient rebuttal of prima facie discrimination).
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If the court does find a Batson violation, it must grant an
appropriate remedy; sometimes it may be feasible for the court
to order the seating of jurors who had previously been excused, 35
but sometimes it is necessary to dismiss the entire panel and start
anew. 36
Finally, if in the end the trial court decides there is no Batson
violation, the accused may appeal on that issue. Unless the appeal
is interlocutory-which requires a postponement of trial-the
only effective remedy, if the appellate court determines that there
has been a violation, is a retrial. 37
Small wonder that, as Professor William Pizzi has said: '' [i]f
one wanted to understand how the American trial system for
criminal cases came to be the most expensive and time-consuming
in the world, it would be difficult to find a better starting point
than Batson. " 38
These complexities are probably inevitable in a system that
gives the prosecution peremptory challenges subject to the qualification that a limited set of grounds for their exercise is impermissible.39 The qualification could be removed only if Batson
See People v. Green, 581 N.Y.S.2d 357 (App. Div. 1992).
People v. Granillo, 197 Cal. App. 3d 110, 242 Cal. Rptr. 639 (Ct. App. 5th
Dist. 1987).
37
E.g., People v. Snow, 44 Cal. 3d 216, 242 Cal. Rptr. 477, 746 P.2d 452
(1987).
38
Pizzi, note 23 supra, at 155.
39
Given McCollum, some of these complexities may arise as well with respect to
the accused's peremptories, but less frequently. A quick scan of reported decisions
at the trial level indicates that the vast majority of Batson-type motions are made
against prosecutors' peremptories. This may be in part because the prosecutor is
less likely than the accused to be motivated to complicate the case by making the
objection. It is also possible that the accused is less likely than the prosecutor to
exercise peremptories on racially discriminatory grounds. Experiments show that
in-group favoritism tends to be stronger when a group sees itself as a minority.
Pizzi, note 23 supra, at 13. This suggests that a prosecutor trying a case against an
accused who is a member of a minority group has a great deal to gain by exercising
peremptories in a discriminatory manner against members of that group, and that
(except in a racially charged case) a white accused has relatively little to gain by
discriminatory peremptories. As for a minority-member accused, the exercise of
peremptories on racially discriminatory grounds against whites is likely to be futile;
in most communities, a substantial number of jurors next in line are likely to be
white.
Furthermore, it is probable that most often when a trial court denies a McCollum
objection, the prosecutor will not emulate the prosecutor in McCollum itself by
seeking an interlocutory appeal, and that will mean that the matter will end at the
trial court level.
In short, it is doubtful whether McCollum will create the administrative snarl that
Batson itself did. And, although only time will tell, the complications caused by the
extension of Batson to civil cases will probably not be intolerable.
516
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were overruled. That prospect, however, is both unappealing
and extremely unlikely. The question then becomes whether the
supposed benefits of prosecutors' peremptories are great enough
to make the considerable costs worthwhile; Batson has so fundamentally altered the nature of prosecutors' peremptories that
inertia alone should not justify their retention.
Prosecutors' peremptories do presumably occasionally prevent inaccurate verdicts, but for reasons discussed previously
this is probably a relatively rare occurrence. 40 Prosecutors' peremptories also offer some benefits comparable to the subsidiary
benefits of the accused's peremptories. But these do not seem
weighty enough to warrant retaining them. 41 And neither is any
concern about altering the balance of litigation.
Putting It Together: The Nonproblem of Asymmetry

So far this article has argued that it is important to preserve
peremptories for the accused and suggested that it may be wise
to eliminate them for the prosecutor. Putting these ideas together
is sure to raise objections of asymmetry, 42 but these objections
should not be troublesome.
For one thing, the allocation of peremptories is already
asymmetrical in federal courts and in a substantial number of
states. Eliminating peremptories for the prosecution altogether
would expand and accentuate an already existing asymmetry, not
create a new one.
See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
One of the subsidiary benefits of peremptories discussed supra notes 26-27
and accompanying and following text, is that they minimize the adverse consequences
of questioning a potential juror aggressively. Juror resentment is far less worrisome
when the target is the prosecution rather than the accused.
Another subsidiary benefit of peremptories is avoidance of hung juries. Elimination of prosecutors' peremptories may produce more hung juries in cases that
otherwise would, and should, yield convictions. That would be unfortunate. But at
least the case could be retried. It is hard to believe that the inefficiencies caused by
additional hung juries would approach in magnitude those caused by prosecutors'
peremptories under Batson. And most criminal defendants would gladly accept an
increased chance of having to be tried twice in exchange for elimination of
prosecutors' peremptories.
Finally, while peremptories for the accused may be somewhat more efficient to
administer than challenges for cause, this consideration, which is marginal only (see
text following note 27 supra) applies only ifperemptories are kept simple-and that,
of course, Batson does not allow.
42
See, e.g., Pizzi, note 23 supra, at 147 ("The immediate result of abolishing
peremptory challenges for prosecutors only would be to remove the adversary
balance that presently exists in the jury selection process.").
40
41
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More fundamentally, it is important to bear in mind that
criminal trials are not about even-handedness. 43 In various ways,
the judicial system creates asymmetries to protect important
rights of the accused. Most obviously, the accused is presumed
innocent and only proof beyond a reasonable doubt will suffice
to convict; if, after all the evidence is in, the jury is in equipoise,
or even thinks that guilt is substantially, but not overwhelmingly,
probable, it must return a verdict of not guilty. Other asymmetries
can also be crucial. The prosecution is obligated to disclose
potentially exculpatory evidence to the accused, 44 but the accused
has no obligation to disclose inculpatory evidence to the prosecution. The accused can decide to testify, but the prosecution cannot
compel him to. The accused can put his character into issue, to
show that he was not a person likely to commit the crime charged,
but unless he does so the prosecution cannot attempt to show that
he was such a person. 4s Similarly, in certain cases, only the
accused can decide whether to raise questions about the character
of the purported victim, such as by bolstering a contention of
self-defense by showing that the supposed victim is a violent
person. 46 And in some circumstances the accused's right to
confront witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution gives him the right to override an evidentiary
objection of the type that would bind the prosecution. 47
As compared to a symmetrical rule, each of these asymmetries
alters the results of the factfinding process in favor of the
accused. To a large extent, though, that is desirable. Blackstone's
statement that it is better to let ten guilty defendants go free than
to convict one innocent person may be a cliche , but it only
became a cliche because it expresses a fundamental value. The
principal expression of that value in our criminal law system is
43
But note Justice Marshall's dissent in Batson, 476 U.S. at 79: "Our criminal
justice system 'requires not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but
also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the state the scales
are to be evenly held.' Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)." Justice
Marshall's reliance on Hayes is criticized in Goldwasser, Note, ''Limiting a Criminal
Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal
Trial," 102 Harv. L. Rev. 808. 821-826 (1989), which makes an argument similar
to the one presented in this paragraph of the text.
44
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
•s Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1).
46
Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2).
47
Davis v. Alaska, 474 U.S. 308 (1974).
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the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which, as
compared to a more-likely-than-not standard, prevents some
fact-finding errors against the accused at the price of creating far
more fact-finding errors in favor of the accused-a trade-off that
is easily worthwhile.
Thus, even if an asymmetrical rule on peremptories led to a
substantially greater number of errors in favor of the accused as
compared to those that would be yielded by a symmetrical rule
(either both sides or neither side having peremptories), that
would not be enough to condemn the asymmetrical rule. We
would first have to ask whether the corresponding reduction in
errors against the accused is great enough to make the change a
net improvement in the truth-determining process, given that
errors against the accused are far more important that errors in
favor of the accused. There is no way of knowing for sure, but it
seems unlikely that the increase in errors in favor of the accused
would be so many times greater than the increase in errors against
the accused to make the trade-off a bad one. 48
Moreover, even if the ratio of these two effects does work to
the disadvantage of the asymmetrical rule, it is unlikely that the
magnitude of the increase in errors in favor of the accused would
be so great as to be not only a significant concern, but to outweigh
in importance the efficiency of denying peremptories to the
prosecution or the perceived value of maintaining them for the
accused. 49
A Rumination

There is a strong case for maintaining peremptories for the
accused. Perhaps the case can be made for retaining prosecutors'
48

Actually, two comparisons are necessary, because there are two basic symmetrical rules. As compared to a rule allowing neither side peremptories, the reduction
in errors against the accused caused by the asymmetrical rule would probably be
greater than the increase in errors in favor of the accused; this is because, as
compared to the no-peremptory rule, the asymmetrical rule essentially results in the
replacement of some jurors who may have a bias against the accused with jurors
who are presumably fair. For corresponding reasons, as compared to the results
under the usual practice allowing either side peremptories, the increase in errors in
favor of the accused under the asymmetrical rule would probably be greater than
the decrease in errors against the accused, but one could not say with any confidence
that the ratio of these two effects works to the disadvantage of the asymmetrical
rule.
49
See supra notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text for reasons suggesting
that the magnitude of the increase in errors attributable to the elimination of
peremptories would not be great.
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peremptories, but this is doubtful, and it does not seem that the
case can be made on the ground of symmetry. So this presents
the possibility of an asymmetrical solution, in which the accused
but not the prosecutor may challenge potential jurors peremptorily. That leads one to wonder whether McCollum would have
come out the way it had if there were no prosecutors' peremptories. Would the Court have been tempted to limit the accused's
exercise of his peremptories? The best guess-and it can only be
that-is that the Court would have let the accused's peremptories
remain truly peremptory.
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